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INTRODUCTION
An issue gaining controversial momentum is that of the school
choice voucher. Under a typical voucher program, the state
gives parents vouchers to use at a public or paiochial school
of their choice, instead of paying tuition.I The school redeems the vouchers
to the government in exchange for funds.2 School vouchers provide an
interesting dichotomy for analysis because of the contrast of two funda-
mental traditions upon which our society is based: freedom of choice and
separation of church and state? Proponents ofvouchers believe that "school
choice, facilitated through school voucher legislation, can revitalize
America's schools." Most school choice voucher proposals, however,
include parochial schools as an option, thus creating potential Establish-
ment Clause concerns.5 Thomas Jefferson referred to the Establishment
Clause as "building a wall between church and State."6 As more cities and
states attempt to create voucher programs which will survive constitutional
1 See Peter L Weishaar, Comment, School Choice Vouchers and the Establish-
ment Clause, 58 ALB. L. REV. 543, 543 (1994).
2 See Steven K. Green, The LegalArgument Against Private School Choice, 62
U. CN. L. REv. 37, 39 (1993).
3 See generally Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954). It is not true that
people have a "right" to an education, although the importance of an education has
an estimable history in the United States.
4 Eric Nasstrom, Case Note, School Vouchers in Minnesota: Confronting the
Walls Separating Church and State, 22 WM. MIrrcHELL L. REv. 1065, 1066-67
(1996).
5 See Frank P, Kemerer, The Constitutional Dimension ofSchool Vouchers, 3
TEx. F. ON C.L. & C.R. 137,137 (1998).
6 Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 162 (1879) (citing Jefferson's reply
to an address by the Danbury Baptist Association).
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scrutiny and as political candidates continue to use vouchers as campaign
platforms, analysis of this issue remains a timely consideration.
Part I of this Note discusses the evolution of the school voucher theory
and provides important background regarding underlying policies of the
theory. Part II provides the constitutional framework relevant to this
analysis. Part III discusses relevant case precedent. Part V iVlustrates
specific voucher programs and the resulting controversies. Part V analyzes
the relevant factors in creating a constitutionally permissible voucher
program and forecasts how the current Supreme Court would handle a
school voucher case. The Note concludes that school vouchers are
potentially constitutionally permissible.
I. EVOLUTION OF THE SCHOOL VOUCHER
A. Background: A Theory of Choice
To gain a perspective regarding both the growing support for and
opposition against vouchers, it is necessary to examine the theoretical
underpinnings and goals of voucher systems and what they seek to
accomplish. Competition is one of the general principles underlying
vouchers.7 If parents choose which school their children will attend,
schools will have a greater incentive to improve in order to compete for
students.' While schools will continue to receive government funding, it
will not be automatic.9 Funds will be determined by the parents' decisions,
not government allocation.10 Schools will have to appeal to the parents to
receive funding from the vouchers." Schools receiving inadequate funds
will be forced to make improvements in order to attract students. This
creates an "educational marketplace."' 2
The critical concepts behind school vouchers have existed for
centuries. 3 The first known voucher idea was articulated by John Stuart
Mill. 4 Mill theorized:
7 See Nasstrom, supra note 4, at 1067.
'See id.
9 Id. at 1067 n.7.
" Jill Jasperson, Renaissance in Education: The Constitutionality and Viability
ofan Educational Choice or VoucherSystem, 1993 B.Y.U.EDUC.& L.J. 126, 127.
I I See id. at 127.
12 Id.
" See Nasstrom, supra note 4, at 1070.
14 lasperson, supra note 10, at 127.
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If the government would... require for every child a good education...
it might leave to parents to obtain the education where and how they
pleased, and content itself with helping to pay the school fees of the
poorer classes of children, and defraying the entire school expenses of
those who have no one else to pay for them.1
5
Mill further alleged that teachers' salaries resulted in stagnate progress and
that their salaries should be correlative of their abilities. 6 In his opinion,
this would create the necessary motivation to improve the quality of
schools.
7
Adam Smith used a similar analysis in Wealth ofNations by introduc-
ing "consumer sovereignty." 8 Smith theorized that students were like
consumers.' 9 Students would only choose the best teachers.20 Therefore,
inadequate teachers would be phased out because they would receive no
compensation.2'
Thomas Paine argued for tax programs that would grant disadvantaged
parents revenue from taxes to use toward choosing their children's
schools.22 Paine's idea illustrates that providing parents with economic aid
to increase their children's educational opportunities has roots grounded in
the nineteenth century.? This economic ideology is the foundation for
modem educational reform through vouchers.
Milton Friedman, a University of Chicago professor, is often referred
to as the "Father of Modem Educational Vouchers."24 He expanded Smith's
"consumer sovereignty" to include the educational voucher in the 1950s.25
He analogized schools to monopolies. 6 With only a limited amount of
vouchers available, both private and public schools would have to "outdo"
"s Id. at 127 n.l (quoting JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 104 (Elizabeth
Rapaport ed., Hackett Publ'g Co. 1978) (1859)).6 See Nasstrom, supra note 4, at 1070 n.21 (citing John Stuart Mill, Educa-
tional Endowments, in ESSAYS ON EQUALITY, LAW, AND EDUCATION 207, 209
(John Robinson ed., 1984)).
'7 See id.
" Jasperson, supra note 10, at 127.
19 Id,
20 Nasstrom, supra note 4, at 1070.
21 Id.
2 Id.
2 See id.
24 Jasperson, supra note 10, at 127.
5 Id.26Nasstrom, supra note 4, at 1071.
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one another to obtain funds.' The government would not simply distribute
funds arbitrarily-parents would determine allocation based on merit. At
first, Friedman's voucher plan received little attention.28 But growing
dissatisfaction with school systems inspired a resurgence in the voucher
theory? 9 Furthermore, reports in the 1980s created a fear that American
schools were in danger of being surpassed by other nations.30 Vouchers
emerged as a potential solution to a growing concern.
B. Policy Considerations
Vouchers have been controversial from the outset for reasons other
than constitutional challenges. A review of the arguments for and against
vouchers illustrates the underlying issues.
Opponents argue that vouchers will not ameliorate the problems
schools are facing, but rather will upset the balance of community
representation in education31 and government spending.32 One of the
primary arguments is that vouchers will further segregate the educational
communities.33 Ifthis segregation does occur, vouchers wouldbe unconsti-
tutional. If students are allowed to choose which school they attend,
stratification will occur and schools will lack equal representation of the
whole community. 4 Opponents do not suggest that the problems schools
are facing should be ignored, but they do not view vouchers as a "cure-all."
Voucher opponents focus on reformation of the current system. Allowing
students to leave a school decreases its aid because aid is usually contin-
gent upon the total number of students. This, in turn, lowers the educational
opportunities offered. The children of parents who do not utilize the
voucher program therefore suffer. Voucher opponents argue that reform
should be in support of the "best public good, not the best individual
good."
35
The counter-position is that traditional public schools need drastic
changes and that school vouchers both encourage cultural diversity and
27 See id.
21Id. at 1073.
29 See id. at 1074.
31 Michael J. Stick, Educational Vouchers: A Constitutional Analysis, 28
COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 423, 423 (1995).
31 See Jasperson, supra note 10, at 138.
31 See Green, supra note 2, at 39.
33 See Jasperson, supra note 10, at 138-39.
34 See id.
3S Id. at 138.
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level the economic playing field by allowing children to attend schools
outside of their neighborhoods.36 With the help of vouchers, parents in the
inner cities would be able to send their children to schools in suburban
areas, exposing them to new opportunities and better facilities. 7
If vouchers are implemented, supplementation becomes an issue.
38
Some voucher suppoiters believe in "unrestrictedvouchers." 39 Schools can
set tuition costs and families can supplement vouchers based on their
income.' Some people, however, cannot afford to supplement vouchers.
Voucher opponents believe supplementationwill contribute to segregation,
leaving some children at a serious disadvantage. For these parents, their
inability to supplement the voucher leaves them fewer options.
As a compromise, Professors John Coons and Stephen Sugarman have
proposed a "family power equalizing" scheme.r Under such a model,
parents would evaluate the costs and benefits of their educational choices
and, "at least theoretically, poor families could afford the high-priced
schools as easily as the rich."42
Opponents of vouchers are also concerned with accountability.43 In a
voucher system, government oversight wouldbe eliminated, placing a great
deal of policing in the hands of parents and students. Voucher supporters
hope that parents and teachers will effectively communicate to establish a
system of accountability.44 Allowing parents to directly control their
children's education assumes that theywill make informed, wise decisions.
Leaving the education system checked only by market factors may result
in disadvantages to a number of children.
II. CONSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK
Education holds an esteemed place in this country. Brown v. Board of
Education' stands as one of the primary cases affirming the importance of
education. There, the U.S. Supreme Court observed:
36 See Nasstrom, supra note 4, at 1072.
37See Jasperson, supra note 10, at 138.38See Stick, supra note 30, at 428.
39 Id. at 428-29.
40Id. at 429.
4 1 Id.
42Id.
41 See Jasperson, supra note 10, at 140.
44 See id.
45 Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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Today, education-is perhaps the most important function of state and
local governments.... In these days, it is doubtful that any child may
reasonably be expected to succeed in life if he is denied the opportunity
of an education. Such an opportunity, where the state has undertaken to
provide it, is a right which must be made available to all on equal terms.46
The Framers of the Constitution, however, did not consider education as a
constitutional right.40 7 Education is not expressly stated in the Constitution,
or in any of its amendments.48 This background provides an interesting
analysis for school vouchers. A program with the goal of improving
education would be looked upon favorably, but not at the expense of a
constitutional right.
In addition, the Constitution prohibits laws respecting an establishment
of religion.49 The Framers were explicit in their intent to separate church
and state under the Establishment Clause. 0 "While the Framers were strict
in their opposition to the church's involvement in government, they were
equally vehement in their opposition to government's involvement in the
church."' This framework presents the question: Do school vouchers pass
constitutional scrutiny?
Ill. CASE PRECEDENT
True voucher theory generally includes both public and private
schools." Problems regarding separation of church and state arise when
government funding is given to parochial schools. Establishment Clause
interpretations generally fall under one of two polar positions: "strict
neutrality" or "strict separation." "Strict neutrality" is the more lenient
form of interpretation.54 This perspective takes the view that the Establish-
ment Clause, "prohibits government from using religious classifications
46Id. at 493.
47 Jasperson, supra note 10, at 127.
48 Id.
49 U.S. CONST. amend. I. "Congress shall make no law respecting an estab-
lishment of religion."
1 Kimberly M. DeShano, Note, Educational Vouchers andtheReligion Clauses
UnderAgostini: Resurrection, Insurrection andA NewDirection, 49 CASE W.RES.
L. REv. 747,749 (1999).
51 Id. at 749.
52 See supra note 1.
I Stick, supra note 30, at 433.
54 See id.
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either to confer benefits or impose burdens."55 Government programs can
aid religion, as long as one religion is not preferred over another.5 6 By
contrast, analysis from a "strict separation" perspective takes a different
approach. Under this view, no government aid of any kind is to be used for
religious purposes." The Court has struggled to determine where to draw
the line between these two doctrines in interpreting the Establishment
Clause.
Consideration of the constitutionality of school vouchers requires a
brief survey of Establishment Clause jurisprudence. Not all of the cited
cases specifically involve school vouchers, but all involve situations where
the government was accused ofviolating the Establishment Clause through
some type of endorsement of religion."
A. Everson v. Board of Education
Everson v. Board of Education59 is the first in a long line of relevant
Establishment Clause cases. In Everson, a New Jersey statute allowing
local school districts to reimburse parents for the expense of providing
public bus transportation to school was challenged by a school district
taxpayer.6 The program included parents of children who attended both
parochial and public schools. 6' The Supreme Court held that the First
Amendment allows states to spend tax funds "as a part of a general
program under which it pays the fares ofpupils attending public and other
schools." 2 In upholding the program, the Court pointed to two factors it
deemed significant. First, no money was directly given to the schools.63
Second, the program's primary purpose was to aid in safely transporting
children to and from school.r The Court compared the program to police
and fire department services provided for sectarian schools for the general
welfare of the students.65
55 Id.
'6 See Weishaar, supra note 1, at 545.
7 Stick, supra note 30, at 433.
51 See infra Parts ll.A-C.
59 Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
60 Id. at3.
61 Id.
62Id. at 17.
63 Id. at 18.
MId.
65 See id. at 17-18.
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B. Lemon v. Kurtzman
Lemon v. Kurtzman6 was the first case in which the Court unequivo-
cally declared aid to parochial schools to be a violation of the Establish-
ment Clause.67 Although Everson6 seemed to set precedent for Establish-
ment Clause challenges, Lemon was more specific in articulating the
relevant factors.69 In Lemon, the Court decidedwhether or not Rhode Island
andPennsylvania statutes authorizing directpayment of salaries to teachers
of secular subjects violated the Establishment Clause.70 The Court
developed a three-pronged test to analyze whether statutes authorizing
public funds to sectarian interests are constitutional. 71 First, the "statute
must have a secular legislative purpose."' Second, its "principal orprimary
effect must be one that neither advances, nor inhibits religion."73 Third, the
statute must not foster "an excessive government entanglement with
religion."74 If any of the prongs are not satisfied, the statute is unconstitu-
tional.7 Despite some apparent disgruntlement with Lemon,76 a similar test
will likely be the standard under which school vouchers are evaluated.77
1. The First Prong: Secular or Sectarian Interest
The secular or sectarian interest prong has lost significance when
dealing with the issue of aid to parochial schools because "the Court has
easily found an adequate secular purpose in all such cases. 78 The Court
will only find that a secular purpose is unconstitutional if the statute's
alleged secular purpose is in truth merely a camouflaged means of
promoting religion 9 Only extreme situations fail to meet the requirements
of this prong."0
' Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
67 See Stick, supra note 30, at 434.
8 Everson, 330 U.S. at 1.
69ee DeShano, supra note 50, at 750.
7oLemon, 403 U.S. at 606.
71 See id. at 612-13.
7Id. at 612.
1 Id. (quoting Bd. of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236, 243 (1968)).
74Id. at 613 (quoting Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 674 (1970)).75See Nasstrom, supra note 4, at 1082.
76See id. Various Supreme Court Justices have attacked Lemon for its alleged
misunderstanding of the Establishment Clause. Id.
77 See id.
78 Stick, supra note 30, at 434.
79 See Nasstrom, supra note 4, at 1083.
80Id.
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2. The Second Prong: Primary Effects
The second prong of the Lemon test establishes that government
programs which "neutrally provide benefits to a broad class of citizens
defined without reference to religion" are immune from Establishment
Clause challenges.8' Basically, the government cannot "grant aid to a
religious school... where the effect of the aid is 'that of a direct subsidy
to the religious school' from the state."82 Problems arise when applying this
prong because there seems to be no clear standard.8 3 Case law suggests that
this so-called "effects" prong is of utmost significance, yet difficult to
categorize." The result is "inconsistent decisions and curious
distinctions." 5 Because this prong predominates the Court's analysis, a
more detailed examination of the case law is warranted.
a. Committee for Public Education & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist
At issue in Committee for Public Education & Religious Liberty v.
Nyquist 6 were amendments to New York's tax laws designed "to ensure
the health, welfare and safety of enrolled pupils" in low-income urban
areas.8" Several programs established by the amendments were challenged
as violations of the Establishment Clause.8 The first statutory provision
supplied funds to schools directly to help with maintenance and school
upkeep. 9 The second section provided tuition reimbursements to the
parents of underprivileged children attending non-public schools.9° The
remaining provisions were tax deductions for parents not qualifying for the
tuition reimbursements.91 The Court ultimately struck down each New
York tax provision as violative of the Establishment Clause.92
SZobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 509 U.S. 1, 8 (1993).
82Witters v. Wash. Dep't of Servs. for the Blind, 474 U.S. 481, 487 (1986)
(quoting Sch. Dist. of Grand Rapids v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373, 394 (1985)). Ball was
subsequently overruled by.Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203 (1997).
83 See Stick, supra note 30, at 435.
8 See Nasstrom, supra note 4, at 1084.85Stick, supra note 30, at 435.
86 Comm. for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756 (1973).
87 Id. at 762.
88 See id. at 759.
89 See id. at 762-63.
90 See id. at 764.
9' See id. at 765-66.
92 See id. at 798.
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The thrust of the Court's reasoning was that the effect of this aid was
to directly promote religious purposes. 3 There was no oversight to assure
that the money was used for secular, non-religious purposes. 4 In the
"maintenance and repair" provision the aid was given directly to the
schools-many ofthem sectarian-thereby advancingreligion. 95 Likewise,
the tuition reimbursement provision also promotedreligionbecause parents
were indemnified by government grants for sending their children to
sectarian schools.9 The Court deemed the fact that the money was given
to parents and not to schools "only one among many factors to be
considered"" and not significant enough to make the provision constitu-
tional per se.9s The Court applied the same logic when striking down the
tax deductions." Despite the benefits such programs may confer, the
overall effect of the aid was to provide funding to non-public, sectarian
schools.'1
b. Mueller v. Allen
Another tax-deduction scheme was challenged on similar grounds in
Mueller v. Allen.'0' The controversy there centered on a Minnesota statute
that allowed state taxpayers to deduct expenses for tuition, supplies, and
transportation.1°2 This time, however, the outcome was different. The
Supreme Court distinguishedMueller from Nyquist and foundthe program
constitutional. 03 Justice Rehnquist found similarities between the Mueller
tax deduction andthose for charity and medical expenses.'0 4 In addition, the
Minnesota tax-deduction program applied to all parents, not just to those
whose children attended private schools.105 Sectarian schools were
93 See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612 (1971).
94 See Nasstrom, supra note 4, at 1084-85.
95 Nyquist, 413 U.S. at 774.
9Id. at 783.
9Id. at 781.
91 Nasstrom, supra note 4, at 1085.
9 See Nyquist, 413 U.S. at 791.
100 See id. at 794.
0IMueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388 (1983).
102 See id. at 390.
" See Stick, supra note 30, at 444-45 (discussing Chief Justice Rehnquist's
attempts to distinguish Nyquist).
104 See Mueller, 463 U.S. at 396.
105 See id. at 397.
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receiving an "attenuated financial benefit,"'16 but it was the result of
"numerous private choices"1 7 of parents that triggered the funding, not a
direct subsidy from the state.' 8
Mueller is problematic because the key factors that separated Mueller
fromNyquistwere formatvariations. 1 9 The constitutional standard became
blurred because the practical effect of Mueller was that sectarian, non-
public schools benefitted from the program."0 Parents of children who
attendedMinnesota public schools didnot deduct the cost of books, tuition,
and transportation because these costs were already covered by the
district.' Therefore, the parents of students who attended sectarian schools
predominantly benefitted from the tax deduction."1 The Court noted that
it would be "loath to adopt a rule grounding the constitutionality of a
facially neutral law on annual reports reciting the extent to which various
classes of private citizens claimed benefits under the law.""' Although the
Court's reasoning was rational, the distinction between Nyquist and
Mueller was marginal. The contrasting holdings demonstrate the difficulty
in articulating an Establishment Clause standard and reflect the confusion
inherent in applying the "effects" prong of Lemon.
c. Witters v. Washington Department of Services for the Blind
Witters v. WashingtonDepartment ofServicesfortheBlind114 involved
the constitutionality ofa program that provided state aid to facilitate special
education or training for visually handicapped students."11 The structure of
the statute was similar to the one in Mueller."6 The Establishment Clause
question surfaced because a student was denied aid to attend a private Bible
college where he was "studying the Bible, ethics, speech, and church
administration in order to equip himself for a career as apastor, missionary,
or youth director."' 17 The Supreme Court upheld the statute on the grounds
,06 Id. at 40 0.
'07 d at 399.
'08 See id. at 399-400.
'o See Nasstrom, supra note 4, at 1087.
"o See Mueller, 463 U.S. at 401.
I See id.
112 See id.
"3 Id.
" Witters v. Wash. Dep't of Servs. for the Blind, 474 U.S. 481 (1986).
"Is See id. at 483.
,16 See id. at 490-92 (Powell, J., concurring).
"7 Id. at 483.
[VOL. 89
2000-2001] CONSTITUTIONALITY OF SCHOOL VOUCHERS
that it did not have the "effect" of promoting religion."8 There was no
specific benefit for enrolling in asectarian college because the same benefit
would have been available if the student had chosen a public university.'19
The Court emphasized that any aid that may flow to religious institutions
would do so only as a result of a student's personal decision.12 From the
Court's perspective, then, the government funds were not advancing
religion.
121
Viewed broadly, Witters highlights the structural factors that must be
met for a statute to satisfy the "effects" prong of Lemon: independent
choice and neutrality." These dual factors played a pivotal role in
subsequent Establishment Clause cases.
d. Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills School District
In Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills School District," the issue was
whether a student could use a state-provided interpreter to help him hear
while attending a Roman Catholic high school. 24 The Supreme Court was
again influenced by Mueller.-5 The Court noted, however, that there were
two distinguishing factors: the purpose of the statute was to aid handi-
capped persons and independent decisions created the link to sectarian
schools.'26 The Court focused on the "effects" prong of the Lemon test, but
found that children and their education were the primary benefactors ofthe
government money-religion was simply a side effect.127 The Court placed
emphasis on the fact that the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act
("IDEA") was a neutral government program dispensing aid, not to public
or private schools, but to individual children with disabilities. 2 The
purpose of the Act was to assist states in providing education for handi-
" See id. at 488-89.
19 See id. at 488.2 Id. at 487.
"- See id. at 489.
" Id. at 487. See also Nasstrom, supra note 4, at 1088 (discussing available aid
that flows to religious institutions only after an independent choice has been made
to attend a religiously-affiliated school).
11 Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 509 U.S. 1 (1993).
24Id. at3.
12 See id. at 2.
116 See id. at 10.
'27 See id. at 12. See also Nasstrom, supra note 4, at 1089.
2 See Zobrest, 509 U.S. at 2.
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capped children;'29 whether the children had religious preferences was
irrelevant under Lemon's "effects" prong.13 0 Zobrest represented a new
approach in analyzing Establishment Clause challenges since neither the
majority nor the dissent applied the Lemon test in reaching their conclu-
sion.'3 1 Zobrest also indicated that some Justices were dissatisfied with a
strict application of the Lemon test."3
3. The Third Prong: Excessive Entanglement
Courts recognize two forms of excessive entanglement: administrative
entanglement 133 and political divisiveness. 34 Administrative entanglement
exists between church and state if a statute incorporates "comprehensive,
discriminating, and continuing state surveillance."' 13 Lemon provides an
illustration of administrative entanglement. 136 Under the statute at issue,
per-pupil expenditures of sectarian schools receiving the supplement could
not exceed the average per-pupil expenditure of public schools.1 37 To
determine if the figures were adequate, the government was forced to
compare the amount spent on secular education to the portion of the funds
spent on religious education.138 The Supreme Court held that this examina-
tion procedure was "fraught with the sort of entanglement the Constitution
forbids."' 39
The other form of entanglement occurs when a statute promotes
political divisiveness. ° Political divisiveness occurs when the government
is so closely involved in religion that it disrupts religious sects. 4 ' Political
divisiveness is difficult to define. Basically, the government cannot
formulate programs that require constituents to take sides based on
2 9 Id. at 5.
130 See Missy Mcunkins, Note, Constitutional Law-First Amendment and
Establishment Clause-The Wall ofSeparation Crumbles. Agostini v. Felton, 117
S. Ct. 1997 (1997), 20 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REv. 813, 822 (1998).
"I Id. at 825.
132 Id.
3 Stick, supra note 30, at 450. See infra notes 134-39 and accompanying text.
' Stick, supra note 30, at 450. See infra notes 140-44 and accompanying text.
131 Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 619 (1971).
136 See id. at 609.
137 Id at 620.
1 See id.
139 Id.
140 Id. at 622.
141 See Nasstrom, supra note 4, at 1089.
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religion.142 Political divisiveness alone will not be enough to strike down
a statute. 43 The Court illustrated this point in Lemon by noting that "[tihe
history of many countries attests to the hazards of religion's intruding into
the political arena or of political power intruding into the legitimate and
free exercise of religious belief."' 4'
C. Agostini v. Felton
The Supreme Court's decision in Agostini v. Felton45 has fueled
speculation as to how the voucher issue will be treated by the Court.'4' At
issue in Agostini was a challenge to an injunction which had been issued
pursuant to the Court's decision in Aguilar v. Felton."47 In Aguilar, the
Supreme Court analyzed the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of
1965, which provided federal funding for remedial instruction by govern-
ment employees on the premises of sectarian schools. 148 The Court heldthat
the funding did violate the Establishment Clause and that the Board of
Education had to restructure the program such that aid was administered
without implicating sectarian schools.149 Twelve years later, in theAgostini
case, the Board and parents of sectarian school students petitioned to lift
the injunction, arguing that Aguilar 'had] . . . been undermined by
subsequent Establishment Clause decisions."'50 The Court reviewed the
case again and reversed, holding that the New York City program was
constitutional and that the remedial programs could be conducted on
sectarian-school premises. 151
Commentators predict that theAgostini decision will have far-reaching
effects on school vouchers."s Supporters of school vouchers suggest that
142 See id at 1091.
" See Comm. for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756,
797-98 (1973).
,44 Lemon, 403 U.S. at 623.
4I Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203 (1997).
'46 See McJunkins, supra note 130, at 831.
147Agostini, 521 U.S. at 214.
141 Aguilarv. Felton, 473 U.S. 402 (1985), overruled byAgostini, 521 U.S. 203
(1997).
149Aguilar, 473 U.S. at 408. See also School Dist. of Grand Rapids v. Ball, 473
U.S. 373 (1985). Both cases were overruled by Agostini.
110 Agostini, 521 U.S. at 214-16.
151 See id. at 214.
,52 See, e.g., Mclunkins, supra note 130, at 831.
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the Court's reasoning can be interpreted as a "green light" for vouchers."
SinceAgostini allowed government funds to be used to provide services to
both public and sectarian schools, it has been argued that the structure of
the funding will be a model for the drafing of school voucher legislation."
Advocates of vouchers argue that, with careful drafting, these basic
premises can be followed to create a constitutionally-permissible voucher
program.
Agostini is relevant to the future of school vouchers because the Court
relied on the "entanglement" prong of the Lemon test in deciding the
case."'5 The Lemon test, which had been criticized in recent Court
decisions, was resurrected in Agostini.' 6 If the Court does grant certiorari
to settle the debate concerning whether vouchers violate the Establishment
Clause, the Court will most likely apply Lemon. Arguably, the test will not
be a pure application of Lemon, but more of a hybrid of the test and other
approaches articulated in recent cases. 157 The result is "Lemon with a
twist,"158 or an altered test that would allow voucher programs to withstand
Establishment Clause scrutiny.
In Agostini, the Court collapsed the "effects" and "entanglement"
prongs of the Lemon test.5 9 The Court noted that "the factors we use to
assess whether an entanglement is 'excessive' are similar to the factors we
use to examine 'effect.""' Among those factors are the: (1) type of
institution receiving aid; (2) nature ofthat aid; and (3) connection between
the institution receiving aid and the government. 6' Since the same factors
were used to make both determinations, the Court found that "it [was]
simplest to recognize why entanglement is significant and treat it... as an
aspect of the inquiry into a statute's effect."'162 Critically, the Court found
that a statute has the primary effect of advancing religion only if it results
in government indoctrination, defines recipients by reference to religion,
"Id. at 831 n.184.
' See id. at 831.
'55Agostini, 521 U.S. at 232.
'56McJunkins, supra note 130, at 832.
117 See supra Part HI.B.
"' Jill M. Misage, Rushing to Abandon a Real Lemon of a Test: North Caro-
lina Civil Liberties Union v. Constangy, 28 WAKE FOREST L. RE=V. 775, 797
(1993).
'59 Agostini, 521 U.S. at 232-33.
160 Id. at 232.
161 See id.
'6 Id. at 233.
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and creates excessive entanglement. 63 Since the program did none of these
things, the Court found the program constitutional.'6
In Aguilar, the Court found excessive entanglement because the Court
"presumed that full-time public employees on parochial school grounds
would be tempted to inculcate religion,"' 65 which could be prevented only
by pervasive state monitoring." Since, in subsequent cases, the Court
abandoned the assumption that public employees are likely to inculcate
religion, 67 the Agostini Court did not assume that the program would
require monitoring.' Accordingly, there were no grounds for finding that
the program would lead to excessive entanglement. 69 Additionally, it is
possible that the Court sought to retain as much of the original three-
prongedLemon test as possible, but applied it less stringently to accommo-
date the coexistence of public funding and religious institutions.
In sum, Agostini is a turning point between a strict separationist view
of church and state and a more liberal interpretation. 7' Its importance is
manifest because it is relied on heavily in the most recent Establishment
Clause cases. 7
D. Additional Tests for Establishment Clause Challenges
Several Justices have expressed dissatisfaction with the Lemon test as
the sole means of evaluating Establishment Clause cases." n Lemon has not
been overruled, but additional ways of analyzing these issues may be
pertinent to a voucher analysis.
1. The Endorsement Test
In a concurring opinion in Lynch v. Donnelly,'7 Justice O'Connor
suggested a new approach for analyzing Establishment Clause cases.
163 Id. at 234.
'6 Id. at 234-35.
165 Id. at 234.
16 Id.
167 Id.
16 8 Id.
169 See id.
See McJunldns, supra note 130, at 813.
See infra Part IT.E.
See Nasstrom, supra note 4, at 1082.
'7 Lynchv. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668,687-94 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
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O'Connor suggested that the crux of the analysis should be whether the
governmental actions convey a message of"endorsement or disapproval of
religion.' 74
Lynch was an Establishment Clause challenge to the town of Paw-
tucket, Rhode Island's practice of maintaining a nativity scene, or creche,
during the holiday season. 7s The nativity scene was part of a display
located in the city's shopping district that also included a Santa Claus
house, a Christmas tree, candy canes, reindeer, colored lights and a banner
reading "SEASONS GREETINGS." 7 6 The three prongs of the Lemon test
were applied but the seeds of a new approach were planted.'" The Court
recognized that complete separation of church and state was inconceivable
because "no institution [in society] can exist in a vacuum or in total or
absolute isolation from all the other parts, much less from government."'
17
The Court held that (1) the display of the creche furthered the secular
purpose of celebrating and explaining the origins of the holiday;179 (2) the
creche did not have the primary effect of furthering religion and that any
advancement of religion was merely "indirect, remote, and incidental";8"
and (3) there was no excessive entanglement between government and
religion because the city owned the creche.'' Justice O'Connor reasoned
thata nativity scene should pass constitutional muster because it serves the
secularpurpose of"celebrat[ing] apublicholidaywithtraditional symbols"
and, hence, "cannot fairly be understood to convey a message of govern-
ment endorsement of religion"'8 2 The Court heldthat the government's use
of religious symbolism is only unconstitutional if, taken in context, it has
the effect of endorsing a religious belief.' Because "the overall holiday
setting changes what viewers may fairly understandto be the purpose of the
174 Id. at 688.
175 See id. at 671.
176 1d.
'"7See id. at 679-85.
'71 Id. at 673.
179 Id. at 681. The city argued that additional secular purposes for the display
included "attract[ing] people to the downtown area in order to promote pre-
Christmas retail sales" and "engender[ing] the spirit of goodwill andneighborliness
commonly associated with the Christmas season." Id. at 699 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
'8 I d. at 683.
'1Id. at 684.
1 Id. at 693.
'83 See id. at 690.
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display," the Court found that the reasonable viewer was not likely to
understand the creche as an endorsement of religion.' s4 The location of the
creche and the fact that it was surrounded by many other holiday symbols
also factored into the conclusion that the creche display did not endorse
religion.185
Justice O'Connor's test is lookedupon favorably by some scholars, but
it is not without its critics. 8 6 The test seems to work well with communica-
tive government acts but does not offer as credible an assessment when
applied to government aid that is noncommunicative in nature. 8 7 Addition-
ally, using the perceptions of society as a standard for determining if a
government act endorses religion may "unacceptably rely on the religious
viewpoint of the majority while discounting the perspective of
minorities."'88 Finally, Justice Kennedy has argued that the endorsement
test only applies to specific fact patterns and does not apply generally
because the Court cannot serve as a "national theology board."'8 9 The
endorsement test has been influential and provides another angle under
which to analyze Establishment Clause challenges.
2. The Coercion Test
Under the coercion test, the government cannot influence citizens to
either support or reject religion. 19° Justice Kennedy employed this test in
Lee v. Weisman, 9' where the Supreme Court held that an invocation and
convocation during a high school graduation ceremony were unconstitu-
tional."9 The Court looked at the nature of the activity and the practical
effect the government action had on the individuals involved. 9 The Court
reasoned that because "[e]veryone knows that in our society and in our
culture high school graduation is one of life's most significant occasions
... a student is not free to absent herself from the graduation exercise in
14 Id. at 692.
's See id. at 692-93.
186 See Stick, supra note 30, at 457.
187 Id.
'88 Id. at 458.
19 County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573,677-78 (1989) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
'9o See Nasstrom, supra note 4, at 1099.
19' Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (1992).
'92 See id. at 577.
193 See id. at 593.
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any real sense of the term 'voluntary.""' The coercion test remains
primarily the brainchild of Justice Kennedy, however.' 95 Several other
Justices have questioned its scope and effectiveness in different types of
church and state cases. 196
Regardless of whether the coercion test becomes generally accepted,
it is clear that the current Justices disagree as to what constitutes "coercion!'
for the purposes of Establishment Clause analysis. Justice Kennedy, for
example, advances a broad definition of "coercion" that includes both
social and psychological pressure. 197 Under Justice Kennedy's analysis,
psychological coercion, "though subtle and indirect, can be as real as any
overt compulsion."1 98 Expecting students to stand or maintain respectful
silence during a public prayer, for example, "may appear to the nonbeliever
or dissenter to be an attempt to employ the machinery of the State to
enforce a religious orthodoxy.""' Justices Scalia, Rehnquist, and Thomas,
on the other hand, advocate a narrower definition of"coercion"that focuses
on that which is tangible and direct.2" An example of such narrow coercion
is the imposition of civil or criminal penalties on those who refuse to
participate in a state approved religious ceremony. 01 Both viewpoints
regarding the definition of coercion surface in modem cases.
E. The Latest Word
In the June 2000 term, the Supreme Court decided two Establishment
Clause cases that add to the expansive precedent.2 2 As the debate about
school vouchers continues, the most recent cases offer the best indication
of each Justice's viewpoint on the wall between church and state.
1. Santa Fe Independent School District v. Doe
In Santa Fe Independent School District v. Doe,203 a named student
chaplain delivered a prayer before home football games. Mormon and
194 Id. at 595.95Nasstrom, supra note 4, at 1100.
See Stick, supra note 30, at 454-55.
197 Id. at 454.
,91 Weisman, 505 U.S. at 593.
199 Id. at 592.
200 See id. at 640-41 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
201 See id.
2See infra notes 203-39 and accompanying text.
203 Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290 (2000).
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Catholic students and alumni filed suit challenging this practice under the
Establishment Clause?' While the suit was pending, the school adopted a
new policy that permitted but did not require prayer. 5 The Supreme Court
struck down the policy permitting student-led prayer as a violation of the
Establishment Clause.
2°6
The Court looked to Lee v. Weisman as the guideline for its analysis.0 7
The Court held that, "at a minimum, the Constitution guarantees that
government may not coerce anyone to support or participate in religion or
its exercise, or otherwise act in a way which 'establishes a [state] religion
or religious faith." 2°
After recognizing that student-led prayer was public speech, the Court
found that the Santa Fe School District policy ensured that "minority
candidates will never prevail and that their views will be effectively
silenced."2 9 Since the student election determined whether the invocation
would be permitted, a sizeable minority of students was subjected to the
religious opinions of the majority. The Court also looked at the reality of
the situation,210 finding that the "situation plainly reveal[ed] that [the
district's] policy involve[d] both perceived and actual endorsement of
religion.""21 The school's involvement in the methods of implementing the
invocation was too direct and was necessarily understood as advancing
religion.
212
Furthermore, the Court was unpersuaded by the argument that football
games were distinguishable from graduation by virtue of the fact that
students were not forced to attend the former.213 Students might choose not
to attend football games because they were offended by the invocation.
Further, the Court noted that "divisiveness along religious lines in a public
school setting... [is] at odds with the Establishment Clause." 214 Certain
2mId. at 294.
205id. The policy authorized two student elections. The first election determined
whether an invocation should be delivered before the game. The second election
selected the spokesperson to deliver the invocation. See id. at 296-97.
206 See id. at 301.
207 Id. at 301-02.
2
1 Id. at 302 (quoting Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 587 (1992)).
209 Id. at 304.
210 See id. at 305.
211 Id.
212 See id. at 305-07.
213 Seeid. at 311-12.
214 1d. at 311.
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extracurricular school activities were not optional to students-band
members, cheerleaders, andthe football team were forcedto attend football
games, and were not to be subjected to religious messages.21s The Court
held that allowing prayers before school football games created too much
crossover between church and state.216
An emphatic dissent was filedby Chief Justice Rehnquist, with Justices
Scalia and Thomas joining.217 The dissenting opinion argued that the
majority opinion set a negative tone and"bristled with hostility to all things
religious in public life."218 The dissent accusedthe majority of misinterpret-
ig the Establishment Clause and of applying the most rigid version of the
controversial Lemon test.219 The 6-3 split of the Court in such starkly
divergent opinions illustrates the Court's heightened judicial sensitivity to
church and state issues.
2. Mitchell v. Helms
At issue in Mitchell v. Helms 0 was the school aid program known as
Chapter 2 ofthe Education Consolidation and Improvement Act of 198 1'1
The aid program channeled federal funds through state educational
agencies ("SEA's") to local educational agencies ("LEA's"), which would
then lend educational materials and equipment such as library and media
materials, computers, software, and other curricular materials to create
programs for children in both public and private elementary and secondary
schools.m The number of children enrolled in the school determined the
amount of aid.=
Although by statute, LEA's and SEA's had to offer aid to both public
and private schools, several restrictions applied to funds given to private
schools? 4 The "services, materials, and equipment" that private schools
receivedwere requiredtobe "secular, neutral, andnonideological."' s Also,
215Id.
216 See id. at 311-12.
217 See id.'at 318.
218 Id.
219Id. at 319.
2 Mitcheli v. Helms, 120 S. Ct. 2530 (2000).
221 See id. at 2537.
22Id.
t2Id.
M Id.
m Id.
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private schools could not acquire Chapter 2 materials, equipment, or
property directly. 6 A request had to be submitted and approved by the
LEA, who would then purchase the items from the school's general
allocation fund, and the items would then be lent to particular schools. 27
These statutorily required safeguards ensured that the funds were used for
secular purposes?28
Mitchell exemplified the changes in fifty years of Establishment Clause
jurisprudence and the difficulties courts have had in "apply[ing] these
simple words in the context of governmental aid to religious schools."229
The Court relied heavily on Agostini v. Felton, recognizing the decision's
importance in reformulating the Lemon test.23 The Court framed the issue
by looking at the two prongs reformulated in Agostini: 1) whether Chapter
2 resulted in government indoctrination, and 2) whether the statute defined
its recipients by reference to religion or whether it has other impermissible
content.?
Government indoctrination is present where "any religious indoctrina-
tion that occurs in... schools could reasonably be attributed to government
action." 23 Neutrality is the criterion that the Court considered central in
determining if the indoctrination is caused by the state? 3 A program is
more likely to be considered neutral if aid is given to a religious school
through the private choices of individuals rather than by government
will. 4 No indoctrination occurs "if the government, seeking to further
some legitimate secular purpose, offers aid on the same terms, without
regard to religion, to all who adequately further that purpose.' 23n The Court
held that Chapter 2 does not result in governmental indoctrination.
2 6
The Court, in addressing the second issue, held that Chapter 2 does not
have the effect of advancing religion? 7 The Court found that Chapter 2
provided aid which was allocated on the basis of neutral and secular
2Id.
27 Id.
= See id.
29 Id. at 2540.
'0 See id. See infra notes 145-71 and accompanying text
231 See Mitchell, 120 S. Ct. at 2540.
232 Id. at 2541.
233 See id.
I See id.
235 Id.
36 Id. at 2555.
237 Id. at 2552.
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criteria.28 This aid was available to both religious and secular benefi-
ciaries?. 9
IV. SPECIFIC VOUCHER PROGRAMS
Constitutional concerns notwithstanding, school voucher programs
have been adopted in several cities and states.24 These programs have been
challenged as violating provisions of state constitutions. 241 The U.S.
Supreme Court has yet to decide a case concerning whether a school
voucher program violates the Establishment Clause. Recently, the Court
decided not to grant certiorari to such a case.242 Nevertheless, examining
adopted school voucher programs could lend a deeper perspective in
determining which types ofprograms can survive constitutional challenge.
A. Milwaukee, Wisconsin
Milwaukee's voucher plan, the Milwaukee Parental Choice Plan
("MPCP"), was originally enacted in 1992.243 Despite several revisions, the
fundamental goal of the program remains the same, to provide financial
assistance for disadvantaged children to attend private schools if they so
desire.2" Participation in the original MPCP was minimal because the
program only included nonsectarian private schools.2 4 The program could
enroll no more than 1.5% of all Milwaukee Public School students.21 The
nonsectarian schools participating were also required to comply with
stringent reporting and accountability measures.247 These restrictions
238 Id.
29 Id.
24 See Kemerer, supra note 5, at 138-40.
241 See id. at 140-42.
2 Jackson v. Benson, 578 N.W.2d 602 (Wis.), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 997
(1998).
243 See David Schimmel, Commentary, Wisconsin Supreme Court Approves
Vouchersfor Parochial Schools: An Analysis ofJackson v. Benson, 130 ED. LAW
REP. 373,374 (1999) (discussing the changes made in the voucher program since
it was upheld in state court under Jackson). The MPCP was amended and altered
several times before the Jackson decision.
244 Id.
24 See Kemerer, supra note 5, at 138.
246 Schimmel, supra note 243, at 374.
247 See id.
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greatly limited the ability ofthe program to accomplish its goal of offering
educational options to disadvantaged children.48
Advocates of the voucher, including Republican Governor Tommy
Thompson, pushed for amendments to the MPCP to expand participation
in the program for both students and schools.249 The amendments were
implemented in 1995.1 ° The amendments brought about the following
changes: 1) the cap on the number of Milwaukee public school students
who could participate in the program was increased from 1.5 to 15%,15' 2)
participating schools were permitted to be sectarian as well as
nonsectarian,' 3) annual performance reviews were no longer required,
4) checks were issued to parents instead of to schools directly,2 4 and 5)
constraints on how schools could spend the money were lifted5I The
amendments greatly expanded the reach of the MPCP 6
The response to these changes was mixed. The Milwaukee Teachers
Association filed suit alleging that the MPCP violated both the state and
federal constitutions.' A number ofnational organizations supporting and
opposing vouchers joined in the litigation.5 8 Ultimately, the litigation
culminated in Jackson v. Benson,29 where the Wisconsin Supreme Court
241 Kemerersupra note 5, at 138. "Duringthe 1995-96 schoolyear, about 1,600
students attended 17 nonsectarian private schools under the original MPCP.'
Schimmel, supra note 243, at 374.
19 Kemerer, supra note 5, at 138.
25 Id.
"' Schimmel, supra note 243, at 374.
252Id.
mId.
254Id.
21 Kemerer, supra note 5, at 139.
256 Id. at 138.
217 Schimmel, supra note 243, at 374. A school voucher can be challenged
under either the federal Constitution or a state constitution. A challenge under the
latter can be substantially different than an Establishment Clause challenge. Id.
2-5 Id. at 374-75. The following organizations filed briefs in opposition to the
school voucher program: the National Education Association, the American Civil
Liberties Union, People for the American Way, Americans United for Separation
of Church and State, and the National Association for the Advancement of Colored
People ("NAACP"). Voucher proponents filing briefs included Parents for School
Choice, the Christian Defense Fund, CEO America, the National Association of
Evangelicals, and the Family Research Council. Id.
11 Jackson v. Benson, 578 N.W.2d 602 (Wis.), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 997
(1998).
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held that the amended MPCP was constitutional under both the state and
federal constitutions.26
In Jackson, the Wisconsin Supreme Court looked to the framework
outlined in prior cases where government aid to religious schools was at
issue. The cases of Everson, Mueller, Witters, Zobrest, and Agostini were
all examined.261 The court considered the neutrality of the program, the
independent decision of parents, and the wide array of schools from which
to choose? 62 The Lemon test was also used in reaching the decision.263 The
court was persuaded by the underlying purpose of the MPCP, which was
to provide disadvantaged children with better educational opportunities,
and was convinced the program did so in a manner that did not violate the
Constitution.
2
The decision has promulgated strong reactions by both voucher
supporters and opponents.2 65 Perhaps more important than the public outcry
to Jackson are the implications the decision has on the future of school
voucher legislation. Many states seeking to implement voucher legislation
may look to the MPCP for direction. In addition, the decision may serve as
an indication of how the Court will treat an Establishment Clause challenge
to voucher legislation.
B. Cleveland, Ohio
In 1996, Cleveland adopted a voucher program under the direction of
Republican Governor George V. Voinovich.266 The program was tested on
atrialbasis throughthe Ohio Pilot Scholarship Programs, which "allow[ed]
parents with children in grades kindergarten through three to select private
schools within the Cleveland City School District and public schools
located in adjacent school districts."267 Althoughthe program includedboth
adjacent public school districts and sectarian and nonsectarian private
schools, the overwhelming response was from the private schools.2 6 The
Cleveland program operated by lottery, selecting recipients from a pool of
260 See id.
261 See supra Part III and accompanying notes.
See Jackson, 578 N.W.2d at 602.
263 See id.
264 See id. at 628.
26 See Schimmel, supra note 243, at 374.
'" See Kemerer, supra note 5, at 139.
267 Id.
268 See id.
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eligible applicants for a maximum grant of $2500 per student.269 Under the
Cleveland program, if a child elects to attend a private school, "the
scholarship check is payable to the parent but transmitted directly to the
school where the parent then endorses it over to the school. If the child
attends an out-of-district public school, the money goes directly to the
school. 270
The program has not been implemented without incident. The
Cleveland program allowing scholarships for public school children to
attend religious or secular private schools has been struck down as
unconstitutional by the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals.271 The crux of the
2-1 decision was that the program's design used federal tax moneyto favor
religious schools.2 Most of the fifty-six schools receiving money in the
form of vouchers had a religious affiliation.2' The fact that parents had a
choice of where to send their children was clouded because no suburban
Clevelandpublic schools enrolledinthe program. 4 Accordingly, the court
reasoned that "[tio approve [the] program would [be to] approve the actual
diversion of government aid to religious institutions in endorsement of
religious education, something 'in tension' with the precedents of the
Supreme Court." The dissent argued that the majority incorrectly
interpreted recent Establishment Clause cases and was influenced by "anti-
voucher mantra [arguing] that such programs [amount to] no more than a
scheme to funnel public funds into religious schools."'276 Both voucher
advocates and opponents believe that the Supreme Court will grant
certiorari to consider the case.m
V. ANALYSIS: WILL MODERN SCHOOL VOUCHERS
MEET CONSTITUTIONAL STANDARDS?
"The Supreme Court, beginning its new term, declined to review a case
involving the politically charged issue of school vouchers. '278 Although the
2 Id.
270 Id. at 139-40.
2 Simmons-Harris v. Zelman, 72 F. Supp. 2d 834 (N.D. Ohio 1999), affid, 234
F.3d 945 (6th Cir. 2000).
272 See id. at 961.
273 See id. at 949.
274 See id.
275Id. at 960.
276 Id at 963.
277 Allen J. Borsuk, Voucher Program StruckDown, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL,
Dec. 11,2000, http://www.jsonline.com/news/metro/dec0/vouchl2l2llO0a.asp.
278 Robert S. Greenberger, Justices Decline to Review School Voucher Case,
WALL ST. J., Oct. 5, 1999, at B10.
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Court seems reluctant to directly decide a voucher case, it is inevitable that
it will be forced to put an end to this controversy.
This section offers no ultimate conclusion as to the constitutionality of
vouchers. Rather, it is an attempt to point out the factors the Court will
consider relevant to the decision and how voucher programs will have to
be structured to withstand Establishment Clause challenges. This section
addresses particular Justices' attitudes toward the issue of vouchers.
Despite the lack of a unifying philosophy among the Justices,
Establishment Clause precedents offer some guidance in speculating how
the Court will handle a school voucher program. As one scholar noted, the
Court has "evinc[ed] a schizoid approach to Establishment Clause cases,
moving erratically between the strict separationist standard promulgated in
Everson and the accomodat[ing] theor[ies.]" '279
A. Relevant Factors
If a school voucher program is to survive constitutional scrutiny, there
are several design characteristics that will be influential. A perfect
combination cannot be articulated, but the following are factors which have
been singled out as critical in previous Establishment Clause cases.
280
First, the voucher program must be examined in its entirety. One
component alone cannot make the complete program constitutional. The
most obvious way a voucher could bypass a constitutional problem is to
exclude religious schools from the program.281 However, the likelihood of
a religious school exclusion is slim since the majority of private schools
have some religious affiliation.282 In order for voucher programs to
accomplish the reforms for which their supporters clamor, the programs
need to be implemented on a wide scale.8 3 Removing sectarian schools
from the equation lessens the impact of vouchers by decreasing the
available choices forpotential voucher candidates. Furthermore, apractical
implication for a religious school exclusion is that with less schools from
279Weishaarsupra note 1, at 546 n.30 (quotingRoaldY. Mykkeltvedt, Souring
on Lemon: The Supreme Court's Establishment Clause Doctrine in Transition, 44
MERCER L. REV. 881, 883 (1993)).
280 See supra Part Hl.B.
281 The first MPCP gave vouchers to parents for use in public and nonsectarian
private schools only. See Kemerer, supra note 5, at 138. This raises the possibility
of religious discrimination charges and may not be effective unless all private
schools are removed.
2 Jasperson, supra note 10, at 139.
'
3 See supra notes 36-37 and accompanying text.
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which to choose, fewer students will be able to participate in the program.
Voucher advocates will find alternative ways to structure their voucher
programs to be constitutional before they allow a religious school
exclusion.
Second, school vouchers should have no problem fulfilling a non-
secular purpose requirement because their primary goal is to improve the
public school systems and provide the best possible education for
students.' While no one wants to frustrate this worthy purpose, it must be
accomplished within the context of the Constitution. Since most sectarian
schools include religious teaching in their curriculum, providing an
education is not their sole motive. If the two purposes become closely
intermingled, there may be an Establishment Clause violation and the
question becomes whether the voucher program has the effect of advancing
religion or whether the religious motives are just a "side effect. 285
Third, the nature of the aid has been an important consideration for the
Court. The Court is more likely to uphold a school voucher program that
provides aid to parents as opposed to providing aid directly to a school.28
When funding is channeled to parents, potential support of sectarian
schools is indirect and a result of choice. If parents decide where their
children will attend school, the result is an intervening act between the
government funding and the religious teaching in sectarian schools. In
addition, an array of public, private, and parochial schools could be
included in a voucher program as a means to withstand any challenges of
favoritism to a particular religion.8 7 Practically, however, there may not be
any real choice. The choice of schools is heavily dependent upon the
schools that are included in the voucher programs. The lack of public
schools participating in the program can upset the balance and have the
effect ofthe government advancing religion. Even when voucher programs
include both public and private schools, questions may arise if only
sectarian schools capitalize on the voucher programs. Voucher programs
cannot be upheld as constitutional if they show preferences for private
schools.
Courts have also scrutinized the character of aid. If aid is distributed in
the form of a tax incentive it is more likely to be upheld than if the
government is paying for a portion of a private school tuition.288
See supra notes 78-80 and accompanying text.
See supra Part T.B.
See supra notes 243-64 and accompanying text.
17 See supra notes 140-44 and accompanying text.
"See supra notes 10 1-08 and accompanying text.
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Finally, the Court may view aid more favorably if some type of
monitoring system is implemented to oversee spending. For example, the
Court could require that records be regularly submitted or random audits
be conducted to evaluate how funds are expended. If funds are used for
general educationalpurposes, such as textbooks or sports teams (ratherthan
to build chapels orpay for religious instruction), the purpose is non-secular
and there is no constitutional violation. An effective monitoring system
could trace expenditures and ensure that the government is not conveying
the message of supporting religion. Monitoring is more readily accom-
plished in cases where funding is provided directly to schools as opposed
to where school vouchers are distributed to parents. Restrictions on how
voucher aid can be used may seem like a solution, but if government
oversight is necessary such restrictions can create additional problems. The
main problem is that if the government is too closely connected with
religious institutions, this may create an Establishment Clause violation due
to excessive entanglement. 9
While precedent has revealed the factors that will determine whether
school voucher legislation is constitutional, ultimately the decision will
turn on how the nine Supreme Court Justices apply these factors.2'
B. What Will the Supreme Court Do?
Scholars have suggested that the Supreme Court has evolved in its
treatment of Establishment Clause cases.291' There is no dispute that there
have been changes in the methods under which the Court analyzes
Establishment Clause cases.292 There is conflict among the Justices about
the proper standard for drawing the line between beneficial government
funding and unconstitutional integration of church and state.293
Due to the MPCP's success, it is likely that voucher programs will
attempt to imitate the structure of the MPCP. For this reason, it is
beneficial to consider how today's Court would rule on a program such as
the MPCP.
219 Jasperson, supra note 10, at 139.
290 See infra notes 291-302 and accompanying text.
291 See McJunkins, supra note 130, at 832. A school voucher case could pos-
sibly withstand an Establishment Clause challenge because the Supreme Court has
adopted a more relaxed approach in evaluating separation of church and state.
Id. 292 See supra Part III.
293See supra Part III.
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CONSTITUTIONALITY OF SCHOOL VOUCHERS
Predicting each Justice's opinion on the school voucher issue is
difficult because there are many factors to assess and several approaches
that could potentially be employed. On one side, Justices Scalia, Rehnquist
and Thomas have consistently taken a more relaxed view toward separa-
tion of church and state. These justices have followed the "hard coer-
cion" standard." Justices O'Connor and Kennedy are not as predictable
as Scalia, Rehnquist, and Thomas, but would probably vote to uphold
a voucher program akin to the MPCP. O'Connor and Kennedy have
each formulated their own test for Establishment Clause cases?95
O'Connor, who often files separate opinions,2 might test the constitution-
ality of the voucher by asking if it "endorses" religion.2  However, she
might use a different approach, as she did inAgostini, using the Lemon test
and focusing on the neutrality and character of funding.298 Justices
O'Connor, Kennedy, Scalia, Rehnquist, and Thomas all voted to upholdthe
government aid in Agostini. 9 If these Justices apply the same logic they
would constitute a majority and thus the voucher program would be up-
held.
Justices Souter, Stevens, Ginsberg and Breyer have attempted to keep
the wall between church and state high. Justice Souter argued for total
separation between church and state and generally has adopted the
most radical approach.3 ° Justices Breyer and Ginsberg are the most
recent appointees to the Supreme Court, so we do not have the benefit
of reviewing their positions on as many past Establishment Clause
cases. However, if their decisions are based on their political ideo-
logies, these Justices will counter Rehnquist, Scalia, and Thomas.
The constitutionality of vouchers is far from settled. Many of the
Establishment Clause cases were close votes.30 1 The nature of the fac-
tors evaluated are subjective and are sensitive to specific circumstances
of cases °.3 2 Therefore, even if the Court grants certiorari to a school
voucher case, the outcome of the decision would be difficult to forecast.
29See supra notes 200-01 and accompanying text.
29 See supra notes 173-89 and accompanying text
296 See, e.g., Mitchell v. Helms, 120 S. Ct. 2530 (2000).
2
" See id. at 2559.
21 See Schimmel, supra note 243, at 385.
299 See Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203 (1997).
3
1 See Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 609 (1992).
30' See id.
3
1 See Mitchell v. Helms, 120 S. Ct. 2530, 2560 (2000).
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CONCLUSION
The primary constitutional consideration in school voucher cases is
reconciling the mandates of the Establishment Clause with the growing
need to improve local school systems and education. Simply stating that
school vouchers will pass Establishment Clause challenge wouldbe overly
optimistic. However, school vouchers are now being designed carefully in
attempts to satisfy the relevant factors that the Court has relied upon in its
extensive line of Establishment Clause cases. The Justices ofthe Court are
deeply divided on these cases and a prediction is difficult. Despite the
uncertainty, guidance from the Court has become necessary. As states,
cities, and perhaps even the Bush Administration continue to implement
voucher programs, these challenges will intensify. Whatever the ultimate
answer to the school voucher question, the burgeoning popularity of such
programs assures that the issue shall remain an intriguing aspect of
Establishment Clause jurisprudence.
